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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The individual defendants seek affirmance of the entire 
judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT ON FACTS 
On or about September 7, 1962, Willaim A. Ralphs and 
Bertha Ralphs, his wife, hereafter referred to as Ralphs, did 
sell, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, to Hank 
Swain and Donna Swain (see Exhibit 1), the following described 
real and personal property in Duchesne County, State of Utah: 
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 4 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL .MERIDIAN 
Section 1: Southeast Quarter of Northwest Quarter; 
Northeast Quarter of Southwest Quarter; 
and the West half of the Northeast quarter. 
Section 12: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter. 
TOGETHER with 130 shares of capital stock of Dry Gulch 
Irrigation Company, Class "A" Stock. 
ALSO: One (1) oil heating stove and One (1) Butane tank. 
TOGETHER with an undivided 25 percent of oil, gas and 
mineral rights but excepting therefrom a lease now in 
existence. 
(NOTE: The mineral lease referred to above, is not the mineral 
lease that is of concern to this law suit.) 
At the time Exhibit 1 was executed, the Ralphs also 
executed a warranty deed from themselves as grantors to the 
Swains as grantees, that was placed in escrow at First Security 
Bank of Utah, Roosevelt office. However, there was an error in 
the legal description of the property sold by Ralphs to 
Swains, in that that portion of Section 1 described as the 
West half of the Northeast quarter should have been the West 
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half of the Southeast quarter. Prior to August 13, 1963, the 
Swains did bargain, sell and assign all of their rights, title 
and interest in and to said contract between themselves and the 
Ralphs to K. C. Ranches, Inc., at which time the error in the 
legal description became apparent. Without preparing a new 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, K. C. Ranches Inc. entered into 
an "Amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract" (Exhibit 2) with 
the Ralphs, wherein the parties acknowledged the erroneous 
legal description and the assignment from Swains to K. C. 
Ranches. The parties specifically provided in said amendment, 
"Whereas, the parties hereto mutually desire to amend said 
contract the legal description contained therein." and "Except 
as herein modified, all remaining terms, conditions and provisions 
of said Uniform Real Estate Contract shall remain in full force 
and effect." (Emphasis added). 
Due to the error in the legal description, and as an 
accommodation to K. C. Ranches, the Ralphs executed a new 
warranty deed (Exhibit 3) wherein K. C. Ranches Inc. was named 
the grantee, and the correct legal description was used. 
Due to a scrivener's mistake, the new warranty deed did 
not contain a reservation of 75% of said mineral rights 
in favor of said grantors, as called for in the original 
contract of sale (Exhibit 1) and in the amendment to the same 
(Exhibit 2). However, before the Ralphs would sign said amendment 
or the new deed, they were personally assured by the President 
of K. C. Ranches, Mr. Carl Bennett, that except for the 
change in the legal description, everything would remain the 
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same, including mineral rights (see lines 15-20, pg. 27 of 
Transcript, or pg. 181 of Record). 
From and after August 13, 1963, until on or about May 15, 
1970, said Uniform Real Estate Contract, together with its 
amendment and the warranty deed, remained escrowed. When the 
contract was fully performed, the warranty deed was released 
from escrow, delivered to the plaintiff Doxey-Layton, and on 
May 15, 1970, it was duly recorded in the records of Duchesne 
County, Utah, (Exhibit 3). 
On September 23, 1965, the Ralphs did lease all of the 
subject mineral acres to the defendant Chevron, which lease 
was duly recorded in the records of Duchesne County, Utah, 
(Exhibit 10) , and in 1972 a producing v/ell was drilled on said 
land. 
On or about November 4, 1965, the plaintiff Doxey-Layton 
became aware of the fact that one of its employees, namely 
Mary Bennett, the wife of said Carl Bennett, the President of 
K. C. Ranches, Inc., had wrongfully used or embezzled funds of 
Doxey-Layton, which funds were used to acquire certain assets 
and properties of K. C. Ranches, Inc., including the property 
which is the subject of this litigation. By way of partial 
restitution, Mary Bennett, Carl Bennett and K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., assigned and conveyed all of their rights, title and 
interest in and to the subject property to the plaintiff 
Doxey-Layton (See Exhibits 4, 5, and 6). 
The plaintiff Doxey-Layton conveyed only its surface 
rights in the subject lands by warranty deed (Exhibit 7) 
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and 3/8ths of its mineral rights by quit-claim deed (Exhibit 
14), to the plaintiffs Lyard McConkie and Ilene McConkie, his 
wife, which deeds were recorded May 15, 1970, in the office of 
the Duchesne County Recorder. 
By reason of the recording of the warranty deed, the 
Ralphs were placed on constructive notice of the error in the 
retention of the mineral rights on May 15, 1970. However, 
actual notice was not received by the Ralphs until October, 
1971. Thereafter in November, 1971, Mr. Ralphs filed and 
recorded an Affidavit of Interest in the office of the Duchesne 
County Recorder, claiming 75% of the minerals in and to the 
subject land (Exhibit 13). On or about May 27, 1972, the 
Ralphs executed and delivered a quit-claim deed for all of 
their minerals in the subject land, plus two-thirds of the 
minerals in an additional 40 acres (see Exhibit 8), to the 
individual defendants herein, which deed was duly recorded in 
the office of the Duchesne County Recorder. Any reference 
herein to the individual defendants will mean those defendants 
who were both the lawful heirs of the Ralphs and who succeeded 
to the mineral interests of the Ralphs pursuant to Exhibit 8. 
The attorney for the plaintiffs, knowing of the claims of 
the individual defendants, did arrange for the attorney for 
the individual defendants to accept service of process through 
the mail from the plaintiffs1 attorney, on behalf of the individual 
defendants. The plaintiffs1 original complaint was filed in 
January, 1973, and was thereafter twice amended by the plaintiff. 
All of plaintiffs1 complaints acknowledged the claim of the 
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Ralphs and therefore that of the individual defendants by 
stating that the Ralphs "may claim a 75% interest" in said 
mineral rights. However, in both the original complaint and 
in the first amended complaint, the plaintiffs named the 
Ralphs and only one of their grantees as parties to the action. 
At the time, of both amendments, the Ralphs were deceased, but 
prior to their death or the commencement of this action, the Ralphs 
had deeded all of their mineral rights to the individual defendants 
(Exhibit 8), which deed was subsequently recorded on April 7, 
1973. The attorney for the individual defendants notified 
plaintiffs1 attorney of that fact, first verbally and then in 
the answer of the individual defendants. The answer of the 
defendant Chevron Oil Company in February, 1973, also placed 
the plaintiffs on formal notice that the Ralphs were dead, prior 
to the commencement of this action. The attorney for the individual 
defendants did encourage the plaintiffs1 attorney to make the 
necessary corrections or amendments to plaintiffs1 complaint 
before the individual defendants filed their response especially 
since personal service would be waived. Although said amendment 
was promised by plaintiffs1 attorney, the same was not forthcoming 
until seven (7) days after the individual defendants had determined 
to go ahead and file their answer and counterclaim, at which 
time the plaintiffs did then file their "Second Amended Complaint". 
Subsequent to said filing, the plaintiffs moved the court for 
leave to file the same, which leave was granted. 
The plaintiffs sought summary judgment based on the 
pleadings and affidavits, but the same was denied by the trial 
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court. The matter was tried to the court on March 18, 1975. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS A 
SCRIVENER'S MISTAKE IN THE DEED DATED AUGUST 13, 1963, 
AND THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT BAR THE 
REFORMATION OF SAID DEED BY REASON OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS. 
Nothing in the stipulated facts or the exhibits would 
indicate that the warranty deed dated August 13, 1963, was 
prepared by either the Ralphs or any of their agents. The 
Ralphs were not aware of the error in the legal description in 
either the contract or the deed to Swains.. The error in the 
description was discovered by either the Swains or K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., or their agent, but in either event, the Swains 
or K. C. Ranches, Inc. would bear the same legal relationship 
to the Ralphs. While the plaintiffs did not produce a copy of 
the assignment from Swains to K. C. Ranches, Inc., it is 
apparent from Exhibit 2 that the Ralphs were duly informed of 
the assignment and accepted the substitution of K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., in lieu of the Swains. However, before the Ralphs would 
execute either Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 3, they insisted that Mr. 
Gardner be present (see Transcript pg. 24, line 30, and pg. 25, 
lines 1-6). At the request of Mr. Bennett, Mr. Gardner 
did accompany Mr. Bennett to the home of the Ralphs in Lehi, 
Utah. Prior to the execution of either of said documents, 
7 
Mr. Bennett reassured the Ralphs that the only purpose for 
either the amendment or the deed would be to correct the 
erroneous legal description, and that the mineral rights would 
remain the same (Transcript, pg. 27, lines 15-20). 
Based on the assurance of the President of K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., the Ralphs did execute both the amendment to the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract and the new deed. It is unfortunate that 
the scrivener's mistake was not noted at that time, but with 
the verbal assurances that were given, and the express language 
of the amendment stating that the only change was in the 
legal description, and that "all remaining terms, conditions 
and provisions....shall remain in full force and effect" 
(emphasis added) would surely cause the average person or the 
"reasonable man" to assume that the same would in fact be 
done. 
Due to the fact that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was 
escrowed, said deed was not recorded until the purchaser 
or purchasers had fully performed all of its or their obligations 
under said contract. Until said deed was duly recorded on May 
15, 1970, the Ralphs and their assignees were not charged with 
notice of the mistake. The trial court correctly found that 
the omission of the mineral rights was a scrivener's error, and 
any serious reading of the amendment to the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract will sustain that finding. 
Despite aspersions against Mr. Gardner in plaintiffs' 
brief, Mr. Gardner had no responsibility for the preparation 
of either the warranty deed or the amendment to the contract. 
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Mr. Gardner had no commission pending the successful execution 
of the assignment from Swains to K. C. P.anches, Inc. In fact, 
as mentioned above, Gardner was brought into the K. C. Ranches-
Ralphs transaction at the request of the President of K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., after Mr. Ralphs had refused an annual contract 
payment from Mr. Bennett (See Transcript pg. 24, lines 18-30, 
and pg. 25, lines 1-24), and Ralphs had insisted that Mr. 
Gardner be present before Ralphs did anything. Surely, Mr. 
Gardner's presence in the Ralphs1 home was as much or more of 
an accommodation for K. C. Ranches as it would be for the 
Ralphs. In addition, Mr. Gardner did not give any "assurances" 
to the Ralphs as he had none to give. He did read the amendment 
to them and on the deed he read only the persons involved and 
the legal description (Transcript, pg. 36, lines 23-28). If 
any representations were made by Mr. Gardner to the Ralphs, 
they were surely the result of both the typed amendment (Exhibit 
2), which terms were reasonably clear, and the verbal representations 
of Mr. Bennett. But in no event was Mr. Gardner the agent of the 
Ralphs in the Ralphs—K. C. Ranches, Inc. transaction. 
The plaintiff Doxey-Layton is the assignee (Exhibit 6) of 
all of the interests of K. C. Ranches, Inc. in and to the 
subject land. By no stretch of the imagination does Doxey-
Layton fit into the category of an innocent third-party 
purchaser of either the land or the minerals. Doxey-Layton took 
what it could to recover a loss occasioned by one of its dishonest 
employees. By reason of the assignment from K. C. Ranches, 
Inc. to Doxey-Layton, the plaintiff Doxey-Layton must stand in 
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the same position as K, C. Ranches, Inc.f taking no more and 
no less than K. C. Ranches had. Said principle of law is well 
established and is clearly enunciated in 6 Am Jur 2d, Assignments, 
Sec. 102, as follows: 
"In an action on the claim assigned, the assignee 
is ordinarily subject to any setoff or counterclaim 
available to the obligor against the assignor and to 
all other defenses and equities which could have been 
asserted against the chose in the hands of the assignor 
at the times of the assignment, (pg. 283) 
"The rule that the assignee of a nonnegotiable 
instrument takes it subject to equities applies to 
contracts generally, and has been applied to contracts 
for the sale of land, contracts for the sale of chattels, 
book accounts, bonds, receipts, bills of lading, and 
judgments." (pg. 28 4) 
This principle is further stated in 77 Am Jur 2d, 
Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 289, at page 534, as follows: 
Under the general rule that the assignee of a 
nonnegotiable chose in action ordinarily acquires no 
greater right than was possessed by his assignor, and 
takes subject to all equities and defenses which could 
• have been set up against the chose in action in the 
hands of the assignor at the time of the assignment, it 
is held that an assignee of a purchaser of real estate 
takes subject to all the rights of the vendor under the 
original contract of sale, including all defenses thereto 
available to the vendor. Thus, it has been held that 
the assignee of a land contract stands in no more favorable 
position than the original purchaser, who has become barred 
by laches from enforcing particular rights under the contract 
against the vendor. The rule that an assignee of a 
purchaser of real estate takes subject to all the rights 
of the vendor under the original contract of sale has 
been regarded as applicable irrespective of notice or 
of the fact that the assignment was for a valuable 
consideration. (Emphasis added). 
By reason of that principle of law, Doxey-Layton can have 
no better position than that of its assignor, K. C. Ranches, 
Inc. Any defenses that are or were available to the Ralphs or 
their grantees as to K. C. Ranches, Inc., would be available 
10 
to the Ralphs or their grantees as against the claims of Doxey-
Layton. Therefore, the unusual circumstances and verbal 
assurances by Carl Bennett as the President of K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., to the Ralphs at the time the allegedly corrected deed 
and amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract were executed, . 
could properly be testified to by Mr. Gardner. 
Plaintiffs1 brief correctly states the lav; (i.e. 13 Am 
Jur. 2d, Section 34, page 525, and 17 Am. Jur. 2d, page 498), 
relative to the finality of a deed or a contract, but defendants 
do emphasis the importance of certain language in the citations 
quoted in plaintiffs1 brief, namely "special circumstances," or 
"where the one executing the document is not mislead as to its 
contents". It would seem that the most casual reading of the 
transcript of the trial and/or of the amendment to the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 2) would cause the reasonable man 
to conclude that when the Ralphs executed the deed (Exhibit 3), 
there surely were some "unusual circumstances" and they were 
"mislead as to its contents." 
In addition, the plaintiffs have missed the fact, as 
stressed by the lower court (Transcript, pg. 21, lines 2-30, 
and pg. 22, lines 1-74), that the counterclaim of the individual 
defendants seeks a reformation of the deed of August 15, 1963, 
so as to correct the scrivener's error in said deed, which error 
resulted from a mutual mistake of fact. It was the uncontroverted 
testimony of defendants' witnesses that the Ralphs intended to 
reserve 75% of the minerals and that K. C. Ranches knew of that 
fact and consented thereto. This court has most recently 
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ruled on the right of a party to reform an instrument to 
conform to the oral understanding of the parties, in the case 
of Bench v. Pace, ? Utah 2d ?, 538 P.2d 180, where this court 
quoted from the earlier case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 
222 P.2d 571, as follows: 
" The right to reform is given, at least 
in part, so as to make the written instrument express 
the bargain the parties previously orally agreed upon. 
When a writing is reformed, the result is that an oral 
agreement is by court decree made legally effective 
although at variance with the writings which the parties 
agreed upon as a memorial of their bargain. The 
principle itself modifies the parole evidence rule." 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, the individual defendants desire the court 
to reform Exhibit 3 to conform to the oral terms agreed to by 
the parties, as well as the written terms agreed to in Exhibits 
1 and 2. 
In Bench v. Pace (op. cit.) this court also quoted Williston 
on Contracts, Vol. 13, 3d Ed. Sec. 1552, in part as follows: 
" It is understood that to warrant reformation 
or recession, the court must be persuaded by the clearest 
kind of evidence that a mistake has been made by both 
parties, or in some cases by one, or that some other 
basis exists upon which relief should be granted." 
The individual defendants would urge that the review of 
Exhibits 1 and 2 and the testimony of Max Gardner is the 
"clearest kind of evidence" that a scrivener's mistake was made 
in Exhibit 3 and that said deed should be reformed to conform 
to the same. "The omission of the [mineral rights] was 
a mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law inasmuch as 
in view of all circumstances it appears the omission was an 
oversight on the part of the scrivener and the parties to the 
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[deed], and the conduct of the plaintiffs clearly shows that 
they made no claim to the mineral estate until shortly before 
this suit was initiated." (quoting in part from Bench v. Pace, 
op. cit. at page 183). 
Plaintiffs1 brief on page 8 tried to make a point of the 
fact that Mr. Ralphs and the witnesses for the individual 
defendants at the trial were confused as to the amount of 
minerals the Ralphs and their grantees were to have. First, it 
should be stressed, that Mr. Gardner and Mrs. Powell testified 
that at a meeting in March, 1972, the President of Doxey-Layton 
informed those present that Doxey-Layton was going to keep the 
minerals. (See Transcript pg. 42, lines 2-25, and pg. 43, lines 
7-13). However, at a earlier meeting, the representatives of 
Doxey-Layton had seemed "surprised" at the fact that they 
had title to all of the minerals. (See Transcript pg. 41, 
lines 24-28). Secondly, in the deed dated May 27, 1972, 
(Exhibit 8), Mr. Ralphs did not claim 66 2/3% of the mineral 
rights in the subject property. A casual examination of 
that document will indicate that the author of the same should 
take no great pride in its draftsmanship, but that the 
66 2/3% refers to mineral rights on separate land, and then 
the word "ALSO" is used to describe the mineral acreage subject 
to this litigation, and no percentage is indicated for it. 
When you consider Exhibit 8 with Exhibit 13, and Exhibits 1 
and 2, then there is a consistent claim by the Ralphs as to 
the 75% of the minerals in the subject property. Furthermore, 
when Ralphs leased the subject minerals to Chevron in 19 65, it 
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was necessary that they lease 100% of the minerals; the right 
of K. C. Ranches, Inc., to any of the minerals was still 
contingent upon the faithful performance by K. C. Ranches of 
the terms contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
including payment in full of the purchase price. Thus for the 
Ralphs to lease 100% of what they still had the right to lease 
was not confusion but the proper thing to do. After the 
faithful performance by K. C. Ranches, Inc., or its assignees 
of the contract of sale, then the Ralphs were obligated to 
assign 25% of their lease rights with Chevron to K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., or its assignees. The Ralphs have always been willing to 
do this, but the plaintiffs have sought to take advantage of 
the scrivener's error, and claim the entire mineral estate. 
Plaintiffs place great reliance on the McKellar case, 
23 Utah 2d 106, 458 P.2d 867, however, the individual defendants 
can find little solace for the plaintiffs there. That case in-
volved the execution of a deed that included property that one 
of the grantors allegedly did not intend to convey. Several 
years later, the objecting grantor and other family members 
entered into a written agreement which in effect approved the 
grant made in the earlier deed. Furthermore, the deed had 
been executed and recorded for more than 21 years prior to the 
commencement of the action. Contrary to plaintiffs1 assertion, 
in the McKellar case the court does not make a hard and fast 
rule that the time of the execution is the time that the statute 
contemplates for running the statute of limitations. Even 
plaintiffs' brief acknowledges that, for it quoted the court 
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stating "The critical issue revolves around the time of discovery 
of the mistake " (Emphasis added). 
If the time of discovery was to be presumed to be the date 
that the deed was signed, then no party in this state could 
afford to enter into an escrow agreement such as is involved 
heref for all that an unscrupulous person would need to do 
would be to have a contract which clearly indicates that the 
minerals will be reserved to the grantor, but intentionally or 
even inadvertently omit that reservation from the deed, which 
deed is escrowed, then wait until the three years have passed, 
and then claim the right to all of the minerals. Such a con-
struction of the statute is so patently unfair and so contrary 
to the real spirit of the statute, that no further comment 
should be necessary. Furthermore, the individual defendants 
would draw the court's attention to the following citation 
quoted in the plaintiffs1 brief, from the McKellar case (Ibid): 
"Although plaintiffs have not pleaded the circum-
stances that contributed to the alleged unawareness of 
the grantors at the time when they executed the conveyance 
of 1947, the rule stated by the court in Hjermstad v. 
Barkuloo is relevant: 
'It is a general rule that a party will 
not be relieved, either by a court of equity 
or a court of law, where he executes an instru-
ment without reading it, when he has it in his 
hands and negligently fails to ascertain the con-
tents of it; the other party not being guilty of 
deceit or false representations as to its contents, 
by means of which he is put off his guard.'" 
(Emphasis added) 
The trial court in weighing the testimony on behalf of the 
defendants, which testimony the plaintiffs did not deny, 
but only objected to because of the hearsay rule, believed 
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the testimony of Mr. Gardner, that there were false or mis-
leading representations by Mr. Bennett at the time Ralphs 
executed the deed. While the false representations may have 
been made without malice, there was at least scienter on the 
part of Mr. Bennett when he represented that except for the 
change of the erroneous legal description, the second deed was 
exactly the same as the first deed. That representation was 
false because the second deed did not contain the reservation of the 
minerals. The Ralphs did not prepare the second deed, nor was 
it prepared under their direction. There is nothing in the 
record that should cause the plaintiffs to reach the conclusion 
that the Ralphs "knew, or indeed should have known. . . there 
actually was a mistake. . . in the August, 1963 deed." Were it 
not for the Ralphs children checking the record, the Ralphs 
might never have actually learned of the mistake in that deed. 
However, by reason of the recording statute, the Ralphs were 
placed on constructive notice of the scrivener's mistake on May 
15, 1970. 
Plaintiffs would like to have this court hold that the 
running of the statute of limitations coincided with the 
execution of the deed. The unreasonableness of the application . 
of that proposition to this fact situation has already been 
treated. However, a response to the proposition that the 
individual defendants did not "commence an action" within three 
years of the recording of the deed on May 15, 1970, is needed. 
First of all, the purpose and policy behind the statute of 
limitations should be remembered. The statute's purpose is so 
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that there may be a time certain within which an action will be 
"commenced". Once that prescribed time has expired, a person 
may know and be assured that the issue thus barred will not or 
should not be brought up or raised again. However, the statute 
of limitations is a personal right and not a public right, for 
its purpose is to assist the individual to prepare his defense 
against the claim that will by statute be barred after the 
prescribed date. Since it is a personal right, the courts have 
long acknowledged that a person can waive the defense of the 
statute by either his expressed or implied consent or action. 
It is the contention of the individual defendants that, the 
trial court correctly found that inasmuch as the claim of the 
individual defendants was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim, 
and since their claim was first raised in the plaintiffs1 
pleadings, the defendants were entitled to assert the same 
herein; and not withstanding that, the conduct of the plain-
tiffs1 counsel herein, relative to delays in amending plaintiffs' 
pleadings so as to name the correct defendants, constitutes 
estoppel in pais, which estoppel now bars the plaintiffs from 
using the statute of limitations as a defense to the defendants' 
counterclaim. 
In this matter the plaintiffs would normally have been 
able to rely upon the fact that after May 15, 1973, there would 
be no actions by the Ralphs or their grantees, etc., relative 
to the deed that was recorded on May 15, 1970, from Ralphs to 
K. C. Ranches, Inc. However, prior to May 15, 1973, the plaintiffs 
started an action, in which they asserted the basis of the 
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defendants' counterclaim. The plaintiffs knew that the individual 
defendants, were prepared to file their own action and that 
they were represented by counsel. If not, then why would the 
plaintiffs' counsel rely upon the counsel for the individual 
defendants to accept service on behalf of the individual defendants? 
Also, the plaintiffs effected no other service in this matter 
upon the individual defendants and had no jurisdiction over them, 
except for the appearance of counsel on behalf of said defendants. 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Ralphs 
claimed 75% of the minerals. Thereafter, the individual defendants 
tried to get the plaintiffs to amend their complaint so as to 
correctly state the proper defendants, since both of the Ralphs 
were dead and the Ralphs had conveyed their interest to the 
individual defendants. From the beginning, the plaintiffs were 
charged with notice that they had omitted at least some of the 
individual defendants. Although the plaintiffs made their 
first amendment in April, 1973, they still failed to correctly 
identify and include the individual defendants. Counsel for 
the individual defendants again requested the plaintiffs to 
correctly name the proper defendants. Counsel for the plaintiffs 
agreed to make the necessary amendments, but the same were not 
made until immediately after the individual defendants had made 
their general appearance in June, 1973, by filing their answer 
and counterclaim. Then the plaintiffs sought to defeat the counter-
claim of the individual defendants by asserting that the claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations. Since the plaintiffs 
had been aware from the beginning of defendants' defense and 
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counterclaim, it would appear that the plaintiffs1 delay in 
filing their amended complaint, correctly naming the individual 
defendants, was to induce the individual defendants to wait 
until after May 15, 1973, to file their pleadings. If such is 
not the case, why else would the plaintiffs have waited so long 
to file their second amended complaint, but then file it immediately, 
even without leave of court, after the individual defendants 
filed their answer and counterclaim? The conclusion seems 
obvious, and as the trial court found, the plaintiffs' actions, 
whether intentional or not, were such that pursuant to the 
doctrine of estoppel in pais, the plaintiffs are barred from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the 
individual defendants1 counterclaim. 
Under Rule 13(a) URCP, the claim of the individual defen-
dants was that of a compulsory counterclaim, and had to be 
asserted in this action or forever be barred. While the 
individual defendants cannot find any language in any Utah 
decision that would stand for the following proposition, the 
defendants believe it would be good law for this court to hold: 
if a defendant has a claim that is a compulsory counterclaim 
and it is not barred by the statute of limitations at the time 
a plaintiff commences an action, and if at the time the defendant 
makes his general appearance in the action, he asserts the 
compulsory counterclaim or elements thereof and claims relief 
thereunder, then the plaintiff cannot plead the statute of 
limitations as a bar to that action. Whether this court will 
adopt that proposition or another one, the counterclaim of these 
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defendants should still stand because of the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais, as found by the trial court. 
The Hawaii case cited by the plaintiff, Mauian Hotel, Inc. 
v. Naui Pineapple Co. 481 P.2d 310, does follow the equitable 
theory that was submitted to the trial court, and from which 
the trial court made a determination that the statute of 
limitations was not a bar to the individual defendants filing 
their counterclaim herein. The Hawaiian court ruled on the 
statute of limitations problem as follows: 
"As stated by the New Jersey court in Howard v. 
West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 
517, 141 A. 755, 757 (1928): 
1(T)he statute of limitations is for the 
benefit of individuals, and not to secure 
general objects of policy; hence it may be 
waived by express contract or by necessary 
implication, or its benefits may be lost by 
conduct invoking the established principles 
of estoppel in pais * * Also it should be 
noted that, while the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais rests upon the ground of fraud, it is 
not essential that the representations or conduct 
giving rise to its application should be 
fraudulent in the strictly legal significance 
of that term, or with intent to mislead or 
deceive; the test appears to be whether in all 
the circumstances of the case conscience and 
duty of honest dealing should deny one the 
right to repudiate the consequences of his 
representations or conduct; (Emphasis 
added). 
This court reached a similar conclusion in Rice v. Granite 
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22; 456 P.2d 159, where the court 
states: 
"Where the delay in commencing an action is 
induced by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies, 
or an insurance adjustor acting in his behalf, it cannot 
be availed of by any of them as a defense. 
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One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary 
into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his 
claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to 
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when 
brought." (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiffs were aware of the defense and counterclaim 
of the individual defendants. The plaintiffs were aware of the 
evidence they must gather and of the documents and real evidence 
that they would need in order to meet the defendants' counter-
claim. The policy reason for the statute of limitations as 
regards the plaintiffs had thus been met. The plaintiffs knew 
that the individual defendants intended to file a counterclaim 
as soon as the plaintiffs amended their complaint so as to name 
them as parties to the action. While it is true that the 
individual defendants could have commenced a separate action 
against the plaintiffs, for them to have done so would have 
merely resulted in a duplicity of actions, since the controversy 
and issues were already pending before the trial court. For 
the plaintiffs to have amended their complaint to name the 
proper defendants would have helped to keep the court's calendar 
from being unnecessarily cluttered. Thus the individual defen-
dants chose to trust the representation of the plaintiffs that 
the complaint would be amended and the proper parties named as 
defendants. It would be extremely harsh and inequitable to 
allow the plaintiffs to commence and maintain an action that 
only named part of the known defendants, as the plaintiffs did 
herein; promise to amend their complaint so as to state the 
proper parties, but not doing so until the statute of limita-
tions had run; then allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint; 
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and then, after the defendants had filed their counterclaim, 
have the plaintiffs answer defendants1 counterclaim by alleging 
the statute of limitations as a bar to the defendants1 claim. 
The plaintiffs argue in their brief that there was "no 
evidence taken, no proof offered on the question" of estoppel 
in pais, and that the matter was first raised in argument 
before the trial judge. Defendants must concede that their 
initial answer and counterclaim did not raise the issue of 
estoppel in pais. However, it should be recalled that defendants1 
answer and counterclaim was filed immediately prior to the 
plaintiffs filing their second amended complaint and before the 
plaintiffs had responded to the defendants1 counterclaim by 
alleging the statute of limitations. While the defendants 
probably should have then amended their answer and counterclaim 
to allege estoppel, the plaintiffs were put on notice to the 
defendants1 position relative to the same in the brief of the 
individual defendants in opposition to plaintiffs1 motion for 
summary judgment. At the time of trial, counsel for the individual 
defendants informed the court that the individual defendants 
would rely upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais (see Transcript 
pg. 11, lines 1-10). This was never objected to by counsel for 
the plaintiffs, and thus by at least the implied consent of the 
plaintiffs, the matter of estoppel in pais was tried to the 
court. Under rule 15(b) URCP, the trial court should consider 
all of the evidence and information available to it, in order to 
determine the issues before the court, arising either from the 
pleadings or by consent, either implied or expressed, of the 
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parties, and thereafter, based on the same, to make and enter 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In this case, the 
court could consider all such evidence to determine that the 
doctrine of "Estoppel in Pais" did apply as a bar to the plaintiffs 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the compulsory 
counterclaim of the defendants. 
The other statutes of limitations arguments briefly cited 
and referred to in plaintiffs1 brief were fully responded to by 
the individual defendants in their memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. As far as mineral 
rights are concerned, it would be impossible for the plaintiffs 
to claim adverse possession to the same. It was a stipulated 
fact that the Ralphs had leased the minerals to Chevron in 1965 
and had collected all of the rentals from said minerals from 
1965 until a producing well was drilled thereon in 1972. There 
can be no dispute that the plaintiffs paid all of the taxes on 
the property, but the unrebutted affidavit of Jessie Peatross, 
Duchesne County Accessor, is on file and of record in the 
matter, to the effect that "mineral rights have not been assessed 
in computing property taxes at any time since 1961." Thus the 
payment by the plaintiffs of the property taxes.on the property, 
which they had a contractual obligation to pay, would have no 
adverse effect upon the mineral rights of the Ralphs. However, 
the receipt by the Ralphs of the lease payments for the mineral 
rights up until the well was drilled in 1972, was certainly 
adverse to the plaintiffs1 interests. The plaintiffs failed to 
introduce any evidence to indicate that at any time prior to 
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the commencement of this action that they had requested any 
portion of the rental payments for the mineral rights. If the 
plaintiffs had really felt that they had a bona fide right to 
the minerals, they surely should have made some demand for the 
payment of the rentals prior to this action. 
In any event, the arguments of the plaintiffs regarding 
the statute of limitations, either as to the three year limitation 
or as to adverse possession or otherwise, must fail, and the 
findings of the trial court should stand. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY OF 
MAX GARDNER AND PROPERLY MADE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED IN PART ON THE TESTIMONY 
OF MAX GARDNER. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that Findings 8, 10 
and 12 of the trial court were founded entirely upon the 
testimony of Max Gardner. However, that is an incorrect 
statement of the evidence. Exhibit 2 is perhaps the best 
evidence that the court had that the parties only intended to 
amend the legal description by executing the Amendment to 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. Although the important language 
of Exhibit 2 has previously been quoted herein, the individual 
defendants would again quote the following from Exhibit 2. 
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto mutually desire to amend said 
contract the legal description contained therein;" and "Except 
as herein modified, all remaining terms, conditions and provisions 
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of said Uniform Real Estate Contract shall remain in full 
force and effect." (Emphasis added). The language cited above 
is more than sufficient to justify Findings 8 and 10 of the 
trial court. It is true that Finding 12 is based entirely upon 
the testimony of Mr. Gardner. However, the trial court correctly 
ruled that Mr. Gardner's testimony relative to the conversation 
between the Ralphs and Mr. Bennett as the President of K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., was admissible as an exception to the hearsay 
rule (Transcript pg. 22, lines 8-11; and pg. 32, lines 15-30). 
It was the ruling of the trial court that plaintiff Doxey-
Layton "stands in the same position as K. C. Ranches, and every 
defense including objections to evidence and the whole bit 
obtains for that is that they are in no better position than K. 
C. Ranches, because they are the assignee of K. C. Ranches." 
(op. cit. pg. 32, lines 26-30.) The principle of law thus 
stated by the trial court is discussed eariler in this brief on 
page 10, where authority for the same is also cited. The 
exception to the hearsay rule that would seem to apply to this 
particular situation is Rule 63(7) Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which is as follows: 
(7) Admissions by Parties. As against himself 
a statment by a person who is a party to the action in 
his individual or a representative capacity and, if the 
latter, who was acting in such representative capacity 
in making the statment." 
Since Doxey-Layton, by reason of the assignment from K. C. 
Ranches, stood in the same position as K. C. Ranches, then the 
statements made by the president of K. C. Ranches, Inc. could 
: ^ . be used in an action involving the assignee of K. G. Ranches,., 
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namely Doxey-Layton. While it is true that neither K. C. 
Ranches, nor the Bennetts were agents of any of the plaintiffs, 
nevertheless, agency is not the basis of the exception to the 
hearsay rule in this instance, but rather the assignment of a 
principal's right from K. C. Ranches and Bennetts to Doxey-
Layton and the statements of that principal at the time the 
deed was executed is the basis of the exception. 
Plaintiffs raise the further objection in their brief as 
to whether Carl Bennett properly represented K. C. Ranches, 
Inc. As to what period of time Mr. Bennett's representation is 
questioned, the plaintiffs remain silent. However, this issue 
was not raised at the time of the trial of the matter and 
should now be ignored. Nevertheless, the only conversation of 
Bennett that was testified to was relative to the execution of 
Exhibits 2 and 3 and statements made contemporaneously to said 
execution by Bennett to the Ralphs. The testimony of Gardner 
relative to Bennett's representations to the Ralphs is certainly 
consistent with the express terms of Exhibit 2, and leave no 
real basis for us to question Bennett's ability. 
In conclusion, it would seem to the individual defendants, 
that the plaintiffs are making much to do about nothing as far 
as the testimony of Gardner is concerned. It would be easier 
to understand their concern if Gardner's testimony did in fact 
change any of the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. However, 
since Gardner's testimony makes it easier to comprehend and 
understand what the parties intended to do at the time the 
written documents (Exhibits 2 and 3) were executed, then plaintiffs' 
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concern seems baffling and unwarranted. The plaintiffs were 
aware that the defendants would probably call Gardner as a 
witness and of the substance of his testimony prior to the 
trial. If they had felt that Gardner's testimony would be 
untrue or inaccurate, they could have produced their assignor 
for the purpose of rebutting the same. However, since there 
was really very little of Gardner's testimony that the plaintiffs 
could rebut, as indicated above, they have obviously tried to 
exclude Gardner's testimony as being either hearsay, prejudicial 
or unbelievable and that failing, now on appeal, to discredit 
the ability of Mr. Bennett to represent his company to the 
Ralphs. 
There is nothing these defendants can find in either the 
record or the law to justify any of the contentions of the 
plaintiffs in that regard. The testimony of Max Gardner was 
properly allowed by the trial court and Findings were properly 
made from that testimony. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
HAD NO RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE LEASE WITH CHEVRON OIL 
COMPANY. 
One of the greatest difficulties that the plaintiffs have 
had with this case is to understand that until May 15, 1970, 
the deed dated August 15, 1963, (Exhibit 3) was a conditional 
conveyance. While the terms of that deed were absolute, the 
deed itself could not be delivered and could not become operative 
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to its grantees until such time as the grantees named therein 
had fully and faithfully performed all of the covenants and 
conditions provided for in Exhibits 1 and 2. Therefore, the 
conveyance or grant of land provided for in Exhibit 3 was 
conditioned upon K. C. Ranches, Inc. and subsequently Doxey-. 
Layton, faithfully performing all of the covenants of the 
contract of sale. Neither K. C. Ranches nor Doxey-Layton had a 
right to that deed prior to the time that the contract had been 
fully performed, which date was on or about May 15, 1970. 
From and after August 15, 1963, the Ralphs remained in 
open, notarious and continuous "occupancy" of the mineral 
rights connected with the subject land. The Ralphs and the 
Ralphs alone received lease payments, first from the lease that 
was in existence when Exhibit 1 was executed and then from the 
lease that was executed in 1965. Had K. C. Ranches or any 
other party tried to assert any ownership over these minerals 
at any time prior to 1971, they surely would have learned of 
the interest and claim of the Ralphs. When Doxey-Layton attempted 
to convey a portion of the mineral rights to the McConkies, the 
conveyance was done by way of a quit-claim deed (Exhibit 14). 
However, when Doxey-Layton conveyed its interest in the surface 
to McConkies, it was done by a warranty deed. The difference 
in the types of deed used by the plaintiffs is perhaps some 
indication as to the regard that the plaintiffs had for the 
legitimacy of their claim for all of the minerals. 
From and after August 13, 1965, neither Doxey-Layton nor 
the McConkies ever made any demand upon the Ralphs for any of 
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the rentals of the minerals, nor did they make any attempt to 
renounce the lease or in any way indicate that the Ralphs were 
without authority to lease the same. If there is a statute of 
limitation problem in this matter, perhaps it arises from the 
failure of the plaintiffs to commence an action within three 
(3) years after the mineral lease to Chevron was recorded on 
September 23, 1965, as provided in U.C.A. 78-12-26(3) (1974). 
Doxey-Layton was well aware of the defect in their title 
to the minerals when they executed a mineral lease in favor of 
Flying Diamond Corporation (Exhibit 14). A casual reading of 
Exhibit 14 indicates that on October 30, 1972, Doxey-Layton was 
making no warranties or representations as to what they did or 
did not have, but rather acknowledged that their interest was 
in dispute. There was no need for that dispute. A reading of 
Exhibit 1 and 2 should have made it clear to the plaintiffs, 
that the Ralphs were entitled to 75% of the minerals and that 
Doxey-Layton, as assignees of K. C. Ranches and Swains were 
entitled to 25% of the same. If Doxey-Layton would have followed 
the clear intent of the original parties, then there would have 
been no disputation between these parties, Chevron would have 
honored the conveyance of 25% from Ralphs to Doxey-Layton, and 
the matter would have been settled. 
As to other issues raised in Point III of plaintiffs1 
brief, the individual defendants believe that the arguments 
raised by the Defendant Chevron in its brief are an adequate 
response thereto. The mineral lease from Ralphs to Chevron 
should not be terminated. 
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CONCLUSION :-:-.r,: -::•-.;:.-tr,. 
The trial court made no reversible error, if any error at 
, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MANGAN, DRANEY & MITTON 
George E. Mangan 
P. 0. Box 788 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 ,.-_•---. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Other than Chevron Oil Company 
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